Appendix:
How Geopolitical Rivalry Undermines Women's Representation

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Contents

A Conceptualization of Rivalries

This study operationalizes interstate rivalry using the Peace Data (Diehl, Goertz, and Gallegos 2021), which positions dyadic relationships along an ordinal peace scale from 0 (severe rivalry) to 1 (security community). The discussion below draws directly on Diehl, Goertz, and Gallegos (2021)'s description of the framework, detailing how severe rivalry is conceptualized, the components that inform its measurement, and the conditions under which states transition to lesser levels of rivalry.

What makes a rivalry severe?

A severe rivalry is an enduring antagonistic relationship in which both states have come to regard each other as fundamental threats, organizing their foreign policies around this mutual enmity. The persistence of unresolved core issues (i.e., territorial, positional, or otherwise) sustains this hostility and creates expectations of future conflict, even in the absence of ongoing violence. It is precisely this forward-looking dimension that distinguishes severe rivalry from isolated conflict episodes. Rivals anticipate continued hostility, and this anticipation shapes behavior independently of whether violence is currently occurring.

Measurement reflects this broader conceptualization. The Peace Data coding criteria span five domains: the existence of war plans, the nature of conflictual interactions, the status of contested issues, patterns of diplomatic engagement, and the presence or absence of bilateral agreements and institutions. Severe rivalries score at the most hostile end across all five, such that war plans are present, conflictual interactions are frequent and varied in intensity, core issues remain unresolved, diplomatic relations are absent or openly hostile, and no agreements exist. Crucially, militarized disputes are one input among several rather than the primary basis for classification. A dyad with few or no militarized disputes can still qualify as a rivalry if the broader relational indicators point to sustained enmity, and conversely, a high dispute count does not automatically produce a rivalry coding if the overall relationship is cooperative. The USA–Canada dyad illustrates this point. Despite accumulating five militarized disputes over fishing rights in the 1970s, it is coded as positive peace given the overwhelmingly cooperative and integrative character of the broader relationship.

Lesser rivalry and the conditions for transition

Lesser rivalry represents a meaningful de-escalation from severe rivalry, though the two share important structural features. Unresolved issues and mutual threat perceptions

persist, and diplomatic recognition remains absent, but the frequency and severity of hostile interactions are lower. The relationship is characterized by isolated rather than recurrent militarized disputes, occasional non-violent crises, and diplomatic hostility that falls short of outright enmity. Russia–Ottoman Empire (1849–1856) and Bulgaria–Greece (1908–1913) serve as illustrative cases.

Transitioning out of severe rivalry requires more than a temporary reduction in conflict. Because the peace scale is multidimensional, movement along it reflects changes across several relational domains simultaneously. Partial resolution or reduced salience of contested issues, the opening of diplomatic channels, and shifts in mutual threat perceptions are among the conditions associated with transitions to lesser rivalry or beyond. Examples include Chile and Argentina, the United States and Russia, Jordan and Israel, and the United States and Vietnam, where severe rivalry evolved into lesser rivalry or negative peace.

B Cross-Sectional Models

B.1 Descriptive trajectories

Table B.1: Countries by Rivalry Status

Rivalry Status	Countries
Persistent Rivalry	Colombia, Cyprus, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, Taiwan, United States
Former Rivalry	Argentina, Burkina Faso, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Germany, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Croatia, Hungary, Mali, Peru, El Salvador, South Africa
Never Rivalry	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Switzerland, Cape Verde, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Moldova, Mexico, North Macedonia, Malta, Mongolia, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Romania, Senegal, Solomon Islands, São Tomé and Príncipe, Suriname, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Timor Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Vanuatu

B.2 Robustness checks

Tables B.2 through B.9 present a series of robustness checks on the main between-country results. Table B.2 applies a stricter democracy threshold (V-Dem score ≥ 0.7) to ensure the sample is composed of more consistently democratic states. Tables B.3 and B.4 exclude Israel and the United States, respectively—the former being the country with the greatest number of rivalry relationships, and the latter the only case of great power rivalry without geographically proximate rivals—to assess whether the results are sensitive to these influential cases. Table B.5 uses ten-year rather than three-year windows for measuring militarized interstate disputes and terrorism, to rule out the possibility that the results are driven by the long-term legacy of conflict rather than rivalry per se. Table B.6 restricts the sample to countries that experienced no militarized interstate disputes in the preceding ten years, to confirm that the findings are not simply an artifact of rivalry states with active conflict episodes. Table B.7 uses sequential g-estimation to address the concern that the covariates in the between-country models may themselves be downstream of rivalry. Table B.8 includes an additional control for women's political empowerment, measured as the number of years women have been legally eligible to hold office, to account for pre-existing cross-national differences in women's access to political participation prior to the study period that may independently shape representation. Finally, Table B.9 replicates the analysis using the principal rivalry measure from Thompson, Sakuwa, and Suhas (2022) instead of the severe rivalry measure in Diehl, Goertz, and Gallegos (2021). Across all specifications, the direction and statistical significance of the rivalry coefficient remain consistent with the main results.

Table B.2: Between-Country OLS Estimates with Alternative Democracy Threshold

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rivalry	-9.155^{***}	-15.040^{***}	-12.766^{***}	-12.415^{***}	-11.746^{**}
	(1.929)	(2.904)	(2.389)	(3.189)	(3.333)
Num.Obs.	47	43	43	43	42
R2	0.160	0.294	0.495	0.498	0.521

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: Each column reports estimates from an OLS regression using an alternative threshold for classifying democratic states. While the main manuscript defines a country as democratic if its average V-Dem democracy score over the post–Cold War period exceeds 0.5, the analyses reported here apply a stricter threshold of 0.7. This restriction yields a smaller sample but one composed of countries that are more consistently democratic over the study period. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table B.3: Between-Country OLS Estimates Excluding Israel

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rivalry	-6.298^{**}	-9.726^{***}	-10.002^{***}	-9.974^{***}	-8.675^{**}
	(2.087)	(2.338)	(2.529)	(2.765)	(2.741)
Num.Obs.	82	75	75	75	71
R2	0.068	0.234	0.340	0.341	0.436

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: Each column reports estimates from an OLS regression that excludes Israel, a country characterized by an exceptionally large number of rivalry relationships. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results remain robust to the exclusion of Israel.

Table B.4: Between-Country OLS Estimates Excluding the United States

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rivalry	-6.214^{**}	-9.609^{***}	-9.850^{***}	-9.856^{***}	-8.502^{**}
	(2.096)	(2.374)	(2.609)	(2.789)	(2.749)
Num.Obs.	82	75	75	75	71
R2	0.067	0.232	0.339	0.340	0.432

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: Each column reports estimates from an OLS regression that excludes the United States, the only country with a persistent rivalry that is not geographically proximate to a neighboring state. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results remain robust to the exclusion of the United States.

Table B.5: Between-Country OLS Estimates with Alternative MID and Terrorism Window

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rivalry	-6.505^{**}	-10.098^{***}	-11.521^{***}	-11.479^{***}	-10.232^{***}
	(1.953)	(2.312)	(2.314)	(2.560)	(2.486)
Num.Obs.	82	75	74	74	70
R2	0.082	0.245	0.362	0.362	0.457

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: Each column reports estimates from an OLS regression using alternative constructions of the militarized interstate disputes and terrorism covariates. Specifically, these models measure militarized interstate disputes and terrorism over the previous ten years rather than three. The results remain robust to this alternative specification, indicating no evidence that the observed relationship between rivalry and women's representation is driven by long-term effects of conflict or terrorism.

Table B.6: Between-Country OLS Estimates with Subsample without Recent Conflict

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rivalry	−6.358	−10.722**	−11.858**	−11.656*	−6.937
	(3.653)	(3.942)	(4.135)	(4.355)	(4.130)
Num.Obs.	45	41	40	40	38
R2	0.050	0.260	0.399	0.401	0.553

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: Each column reports estimates from an OLS regression restricted to countries with no militarized interstate disputes in the past ten years. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Although this restriction substantially reduces the sample size, to roughly half of the original sample, the estimates remain substantively similar in direction and magnitude to the main results. While statistical significance is attenuated in the bivariate and fully specified models, the overall pattern of results remains consistent, supporting the robustness of the findings.

Table B.7: Sequential G-Estimates of the Controlled Direct Effect of Rivalry

	All post-treatment pathways	Institutional ordering	Security ordering
Rivalry	−8.738***	−8.148***	−5.700**
	(1.765)	(1.965)	(1.840)

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table reports sequential g-estimates of the controlled direct effect of rivalry. Columns vary the assumed causal ordering of potentially post-treatment covariates. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Because rivalry onset occurs at different historical moments, few covariates can be classified as pre-treatment for all countries. I therefore use sequential g-estimation as a robustness check rather than as a standalone causal identification strategy, since the assumptions required for a causal interpretation—especially the absence of unobserved pre-treatment confounding—are unlikely to be fully satisfied in this setting. I estimate three specifications that vary the assumed causal ordering of the covariates: one treating all covariates as post-treatment pathways, one treating institutional and economic variables as intermediate confounders (mean-centered logged GDP per capita and democracy), and one treating security-related variables as intermediate confounders (terrorism in the past three years, MIDs in the past three years, and mean-centered logged military spending

as a share of GDP). Across all three specifications, the estimated controlled direct effect of rivalry remains negative and statistically significant (Table B.7).

Table B.8: Between-Country OLS Estimates with Additional Control for Women's Empowerment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rivalry	-6.505^{**}	-9.655^{***}	-11.350^{***}	-11.303^{***}	-10.069^{***}
	(1.953)	(2.309)	(2.340)	(2.574)	(2.518)
Num.Obs.	82	75	74	74	70
R2	0.082	0.236	0.361	0.361	0.450

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table presents results with an additional control for women's political empowerment. In addition to the baseline controls, Column 5 includes the number of years women have been legally eligible to hold office. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results are robust to this additional control.

Table B.9: Between-Country OLS Estimates with Principal Rivalry Measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rivalry	-7.688^{***}	-9.360^{***}	-9.648^{***}	-9.546^{***}	-8.876^{***}
	(1.432)	(1.961)	(2.172)	(2.454)	(2.307)
Num.Obs.	82	75	74	74	70
R2	0.086	0.190	0.284	0.284	0.390

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table presents results using an alternative measure of rivalry. The analysis replicates the baseline specification using the principal rivalry measure from Thompson, Sakuwa, and Suhas (2022) instead of the severe rivalry measure in Diehl, Goertz, and Gallegos (2021). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results are robust to this alternative specification.

B.3 Sensitivity analysis

As an additional sensitivity check, I use `sensemakr` to assess how strong an omitted confounder would need to be to explain away the estimated association between rivalry

and women's parliamentary representation (Cinelli and Hazlett 2020). The analysis indicates that the result is robust to substantial omitted confounding: an omitted confounder would need to explain 33.6% of the residual variation in both rivalry status and women's parliamentary representation to reduce the estimated association to zero. Benchmarking against observed covariates further shows that even an omitted confounder as strong as log military spending, the strongest observed benchmark, would reduce the rivalry coefficient only from -8.74 to -6.34, leaving the association negative and statistically distinguishable from zero (see Figure B.1).

Figure B.1: Sensitivity Analysis for Omitted Confounding



Note: The table reports sensitivity statistics for the fully specified cross-sectional OLS model. The treatment is rivalry status and the outcome is women's parliamentary representation. Benchmarking uses log military spending, the strongest observed confounding benchmark. Robustness values indicate the strength of association an omitted confounder would need to have with both treatment and outcome, net of observed covariates, to reduce the estimated rivalry effect to zero.

C TWFE Models

C.1 Full model results

Table C.1: Within-Country TWFE Estimates

	All rivalry episodes	Lasting 5 years	Lasting 10 years
Rivalry	−1.537	−2.538*	−3.736**
	(1.124)	(0.953)	(1.179)
Terrorism	−1.655	−2.780*	−2.979*
	(1.446)	(1.279)	(1.159)
MID	−6.414*	−4.297+	−3.304
	(2.528)	(2.202)	(2.022)
Log military spending	0.077	−0.099	0.585
	(1.300)	(1.363)	(1.502)
Log GDP per capita	−13.729***	−14.251***	−16.959**
	(3.239)	(3.493)	(4.696)
Democracy	0.727	3.371	0.671
	(9.391)	(9.534)	(10.687)
NATO membership	−7.289*	−6.229	
	(3.222)	(4.422)	
EU membership	1.406	−4.194*	
	(3.998)	(1.806)	
Gender quota	2.834	2.340	1.002
	(2.005)	(2.073)	(2.446)
Mixed regime	10.847***	11.411***	11.235***
	(2.638)	(2.638)	(2.430)
Left executive	2.789**	2.765*	4.892**
	(0.877)	(0.975)	(1.362)
Num.Obs.	746	703	483
R2	0.831	0.835	0.848

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: The table reports estimates from two-way fixed effects models in which the dependent

variable is the proportion of women in parliament and the key explanatory variable is rivalry status lagged by one year. The first model includes all 23 countries that experienced a change in rivalry status during the study period. The second and third models restrict the sample to countries with more sustained rivalries by excluding cases with fewer than 5 and 10 total years of rivalry, respectively. All models include the full set of control covariates. Estimates for NATO membership and EU membership are omitted in the model restricted to rivalries lasting 10 years or more due to collinearity. Country-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

C.2 Robustness checks

Table C.2 progressively restricts the sample to countries with sustained rivalries. As the threshold increases, the rivalry coefficient grows in magnitude and becomes statistically significant, suggesting that the effect is in fact stronger for sustained rivalries than for fleeting ones. The attenuation of significance in the 15+ year specification is expected given that this restriction reduces the sample to roughly half of the original, substantially limiting statistical power. Nevertheless, the coefficient remains negative and substantively comparable in magnitude to the more precisely estimated 10 year specification, supporting the robustness of the main findings. Table C.3 replicates the main analysis without the logged military spending share, restoring Costa Rica to the sample. The results remain robust to this alternative specification. Table C.4 reports results from models that include only country and year fixed effects, without additional time-varying covariates. The estimates are substantively similar to the fully adjusted specifications, indicating that the findings are not driven by conditioning on potentially post-treatment controls.

Table C.2: TWFE Estimates with Long-Standing Rivalries

	All rivalry episodes	Lasting 5 years	Lasting 10 years	Lasting 15 years
Rivalry	−1.537	−2.538*	−3.736**	−2.833
	(1.124)	(0.953)	(1.179)	(1.633)
Num.Obs.	746	703	483	377
R2	0.831	0.835	0.848	0.862

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: The table reports estimates from two-way fixed effects models in which the dependent variable is the proportion of women in parliament and the key explanatory variable is rivalry status lagged by one year. The first model includes all countries that experienced a change in rivalry status during the study period. The second, third, and fourth models restrict the sample to countries with more sustained rivalries, excluding cases with fewer than 5, 10, and 15 total years of rivalry, respectively. All models include country and year fixed effects alongside the full set of covariates (terrorism, MID, logged military expenditure, logged GDP per capita, democracy, NATO membership, EU membership, gender quota, mixed electoral regime, and left executive). Country-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table C.3: TWFE Estimates Excluding Military Expenditure Control

	All rivalry episodes	Lasting 5 years	Lasting 10 years	Lasting 15 years
Rivalry	−2.310*	−3.201**	−4.113***	−3.275*
	(1.079)	(0.928)	(0.962)	(1.345)
Num.Obs.	799	756	532	425
R2	0.826	0.829	0.837	0.838

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table reports TWFE estimates from models that omit the military spending control. Omitting this control retains Costa Rica, which is excluded from the fully specified TWFE models because military expenditure data are unavailable for the country across the study period. All models include country and year fixed effects and the remaining covariates from the main TWFE specification. Country-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results remain robust to this alternative specification.

Table C.4: TWFE Estimates Without Time-Varying Controls

	All rivalry episodes	Rivalries lasting 5 years	Rivalries lasting 10 years
Rivalry	-4.511^{*}	-5.119^{**}	-4.372^{***}
	(1.781)	(1.773)	(0.995)
Num.Obs.	910	865	616
R2	0.692	0.685	0.746

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table reports two-way fixed effects estimates from models that include only country and year fixed effects, without additional time-varying covariates. The dependent variable is the percentage of seats held by women in parliament, and the key explanatory variable is rivalry status lagged by one year. Country-clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.

D Generalized Synthetic Control

D.1 Sample restrictions

This section outlines the sample restrictions applied in the GSC design to ensure reliable counterfactual construction. First, among the 22 countries that transitioned from rivalry to peaceful relations, I retain only cases with at least 10 pre-treatment observations. A sufficiently long pre-treatment period is necessary to recover latent factor structures and to ensure that the synthetic counterfactual closely tracks treated units before rivalry exit. Without adequate pre-treatment observations, counterfactual estimates may be unstable and overly sensitive to short-term fluctuations rather than underlying trends.

Second, I exclude years that precede the onset of the relevant rivalry episode for several cases, including Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, and Peru (before 1978), and Guatemala (before 1994). The estimand of interest is the effect of exiting rivalry relative to a counterfactual in which rivalry continues. Accordingly, the pre-treatment period should reflect conditions under ongoing rivalry. Observations coded as non-rivalry before rivalry onset represent a different security environment, one in which rivalry had not yet shaped institutions, elite incentives, or political behavior. Including these years would anchor the counterfactual trajectory in a non-rivalry baseline rather than a rivalry baseline, weakening the interpretation of post-exit divergence. I therefore restrict the pre-treatment window to years in which the rivalry was already ongoing. Countries that no longer have at least 10 pre-treatment observations after this restriction are excluded from the GSC analysis.

After applying these criteria, the final treated units are Ecuador, France, the United Kingdom, Guyana, Peru, El Salvador, and South Africa. The control units consist of Cyprus, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey, and the United States.

D.2 Model specification

I fit the following GSC model with two-way fixed effects:

$$Y_{it} = \delta_t D_{it} + \lambda_i' f_t + \mu_i + \nu_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where Y_{it} is the proportion (%) of women in parliament for country i in year t and D_{it} is the treatment indicator, equal to 1 if country i has exited its rivalry in year t or thereafter and 0 otherwise. The term f_t represents latent time-varying factors capturing unobserved global or regional influences, and λ_i denotes unit-specific factor loadings that govern how each country responds to these common shocks. The parameters μ_i and ν_t capture unit and time fixed effects, respectively, and ε_{it} is an idiosyncratic error term reflecting short-term, country-year-specific deviations. The coefficient δ_t represents the estimated effect of rivalry termination at each time period t. To avoid conditioning on covariates that may themselves be affected by rivalry or its termination, the specification excludes time-varying controls. Standard errors are computed through a nonparametric bootstrap with 1,000 replications, clustered at the country level.

E Reservist Beliefs and Militarism

In this section, I position reservist beliefs within the broader literature on militarism and clarify how the concept extends existing conceptualizations. Prior research shows that states engaged in long-term interstate hostility tend to exhibit heightened militarism, and that militarism constrains women's access to positions of power (Kim and Kang 2022; Kwon 2000). While this insight is valuable, it also raises the question of what the term "militarism" actually refers to. Stavrianakis and Selby (2012) identify five approaches to conceptualizing militarism: militarism as an ideology that glorifies war and martial values; as behavior, defined by a propensity to use force; as military build up, reflected in increases in personnel, expenditure, and arms; as an institutional condition in which the military exerts influence over political authority; and as a sociological process referring to the penetration of social relations by military values. The concept of reservist beliefs is distinct from the first four conceptions of militarism because it does not require support for war, a propensity to use force, or the material and institutional expansion of military power. Instead, it builds on and extends the sociological conception, which locates

military values within broader social relations. Yet, as an umbrella concept, sociological militarism captures the general diffusion of military values without specifying the concrete predispositions that emerge from it. The concept of reservist beliefs addresses this limitation by identifying the specific predispositions produced by rivalry-induced militarization — deference to hierarchical authority, civic duty oriented toward national defense, and trust in state institutions — and tracing how each undermines public confidence in women's leadership.

F Mechanism Tests

F.1 Sample countries

To maintain consistency with the cross-national observational analyses, the IVS sample is restricted to countries included in the main observational sample. The analyses include respondents from 47 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Croatia, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Mexico, North Macedonia, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, El Salvador, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Taiwan, Uruguay, the United States, and South Africa.

F.2 Full model results

Table F.1: Bias Against Women's Leadership (Full Model)

	Women Leader
Rivalry	−0.045**
	(0.014)
Prop. women in parl.	0.042***
	(0.006)
Gender quota	0.052***
	(0.011)

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Table F.1: Bias Against Women's Leadership (Full Model) (Continued)

Log GDP per capita	0.032+
	(0.016)
Terrorism	0.002
	(0.003)
MID	0.002
	(0.004)
Democracy	−0.033***
	(0.007)
Log military spending	−0.010
	(0.008)
NATO membership	0.023
	(0.053)
EU membership	−0.002
	(0.054)
Mixed regime	−0.017
	(0.023)
Left executive	−0.005
	(0.004)
Age	−0.025***
	(0.001)
Gender	0.116***
	(0.002)
Income	0.019***
	(0.001)
Religiosity	0.016***
	(0.002)
Ideology	−0.035***
	(0.001)

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Table F.1: Bias Against Women's Leadership (Full Model) (Continued)

Do not belong to denomination	−0.007+
	(0.004)
Catholic	−0.017***
	(0.004)
Protestant	0.003
	(0.010)
Orthodox	0.018
	(0.021)
Jew	−0.093***
	(0.009)
Muslim	−0.065***
	(0.011)
Hindu	−0.046***
	(0.010)
Buddhist	−0.042***
	(0.010)
Other Christian	−0.012
	(0.007)
Num.Obs.	125 417

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table reports estimates from a hierarchical linear model in which the dependent variable is support for women as political leaders and the key independent variable is rivalry status. Random intercepts are included for country and survey year. Degrees of freedom for fixed-effect tests are approximated using Satterthwaite's method.

Table F.2: Threat Perception in Security Environments (Full Model)

	Secure Envirn	War Concern	Terror Concern
Rivalry	−0.798*	0.278	−0.116
	(0.296)	(0.218)	(0.243)

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Table F.2: Threat Perception in Security Environments (Full Model) (Continued)

Terrorism	−0.066*	0.140***	0.196***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.031)
MID	0.156***	0.012	0.087**
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Prop. women in parl.	−0.208***	−0.039	−0.074
	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.059)
Gender quota	0.460***	0.328*	0.371*
	(0.068)	(0.159)	(0.176)
Log GDP per capita	−0.206	−0.166	−0.090
	(0.107)	(0.090)	(0.100)
Democracy	0.009	−0.098	−0.200**
	(0.078)	(0.058)	(0.064)
Log military spending	0.442***	−0.171*	0.024
	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.083)
NATO membership	−0.405	−0.054	−0.246
	(0.296)	(0.226)	(0.250)
EU membership	0.178	−0.172	0.188
	(0.285)	(0.218)	(0.241)
Mixed regime	−0.574***	0.037	0.037
	(0.102)	(0.159)	(0.176)
Left executive	−0.164***	−0.059	−0.212***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Age	0.069***	−0.003	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gender	0.128***	0.118***	0.095***
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Income	−0.002	−0.044***	−0.030***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Religiosity	−0.072***	−0.064***	−0.087***

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Table F.2: Threat Perception in Security Environments (Full Model) (Continued)

	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ideology	0.026***	0.014***	0.041***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Do not belong to denomination	0.083***	0.008	0.044***
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Catholic	0.061***	−0.012	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Protestant	0.161***	−0.035	−0.120**
	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Orthodox	0.067	−0.068	0.054
	(0.101)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Jew	0.119**	0.115***	0.145***
	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Muslim	0.028	−0.022	−0.036
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Hindu	0.074	0.057	0.108**
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Buddhist	0.054	0.009	0.029
	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Other Christian	0.056*	−0.054*	−0.012
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Num.Obs.	57 055	52 457	52 510

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table reports coefficients from hierarchical linear models with random intercepts for country and year. Each column corresponds to a separate model using an item from the IVS as the dependent variable: the importance of living in a secure environment (Column 1), concern about war involving one's country (Column 2), and concern about terrorism (Column 3). Each row reports the estimated coefficients for rivalry status (Row 1), exposure to terrorism within the past three years (Row 2), and experience of a militarized interstate dispute within the past three years (Row 3). Degrees of freedom for fixed-effect tests are approximated using Satterthwaite's method.

Table F.3: Reservist Attitudes in Rivalries (Full Model)

	Respect Authority	Willing Fight	Trust Gov	Trust Army	Trust Parl	Trust Party
Rivalry	0.047*	0.061***	0.125***	0.064*	−0.084**	−0.159***
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Terrorism	−0.020***	0.002	0.043***	−0.024***	0.017**	0.033***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
MID	−0.014*	−0.009*	−0.019*	−0.031***	−0.017*	0.018**
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Prop. women in parl.	−0.049***	−0.032***	−0.047***	−0.027**	0.021*	0.029**
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Gender quota	0.151***	0.066***	0.009	−0.033*	−0.069***	−0.068***
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Log GDP per capita	0.022	−0.147***	−0.317***	−0.154***	−0.326***	−0.296***
	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Democracy	−0.018*	−0.002	−0.143***	−0.033***	−0.136***	−0.073***
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Log military spending	0.040***	0.015	0.042*	0.212***	−0.111***	−0.061***
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
NATO membership	0.014	0.010	−0.196	0.024	−0.074	0.033
	(0.151)	(0.067)	(0.215)	(0.137)	(0.256)	(0.189)
EU membership	−0.193	0.100	−0.047	−0.073	−0.217	−0.028
	(0.152)	(0.068)	(0.216)	(0.138)	(0.256)	(0.189)
Mixed regime	−0.010	0.023	0.224***	0.029	0.311***	0.306***

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Table F.3: Reservist Attitudes in Rivalries (Full Model) (Continued)

	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.046)
Left executive	0.044***	0.009	0.023**	0.008	0.015	0.014
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age	0.043***	−0.004**	0.024***	0.062***	0.007**	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gender	−0.012***	−0.124***	−0.010*	−0.085***	−0.023***	−0.010*
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Income	−0.019***	−0.001	0.005*	0.001	0.012***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religiosity	−0.070***	−0.030***	−0.069***	−0.095***	−0.063***	−0.064***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Ideology	0.045***	0.028***	0.044***	0.082***	0.025***	0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Do not belong to denomination	0.049***	0.027***	0.057***	0.122***	0.050***	0.056***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Catholic	0.052***	0.036***	0.029***	0.103***	0.031***	0.037***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Protestant	0.150***	−0.026**	−0.011	−0.080***	−0.007	−0.037*
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Orthodox	−0.111***	0.002	−0.045	−0.092*	0.033	0.044
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Jew	0.001	0.049***	0.172***	0.124***	0.152***	0.115***

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Table F.3: Reservist Attitudes in Rivalries (Full Model) (Continued)

	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Muslim	0.086***	0.011	−0.030	0.058**	−0.034	−0.029
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Hindu	0.002	0.033***	0.093***	0.090***	0.083***	0.091***
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Buddhist	0.053***	−0.039***	−0.027	0.027	−0.027	−0.018
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Other Christian	0.023*	0.012	−0.001	0.034*	0.001	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Num.Obs.	137 520	123 549	130 433	137 919	137 349	134 191
Num.Ctry	47	46	46	47	47	47

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table reports coefficients from hierarchical linear models with random intercepts for country and year. Each column corresponds to a separate model using items from the IVS as the dependent variable, and each row reports the estimated coefficients for rivalry status (Row 1), exposure to terrorism within the past three years (Row 2), and experience of a militarized interstate dispute within the past three years (Row 3). Degrees of freedom for fixed-effect tests are approximated using Satterthwaite's method. To address concerns about multiple comparisons, p-values for the three focal predictors — rivalry, terrorism, and MIDs — are corrected using the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure across all six outcome models. Stars for control variables are based on unadjusted p-values.

Table F.4: Reservist Attitudes and Bias Against Women's Leadership (Full Model)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Respect Authority	−0.024***			
	(0.002)			
Willing Fight		−0.007*		
		(0.003)		
Trust Gov			−0.027***	
			(0.001)	
Trust Army				−0.019***
				(0.002)
Rivalry	−0.043**	−0.039**	−0.041**	−0.041**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Terrorism	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
MID	0.001	−0.002	0.002	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Prop. women in parl.	0.040***	0.042***	0.041***	0.040***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Gender quota	0.051***	0.043***	0.047***	0.049***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Log GDP per capita	0.032	0.028	0.026	0.034*
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Democracy	−0.035***	−0.033***	−0.036***	−0.033***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Log military spending	−0.011	−0.013	−0.009	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
NATO membership	0.027	0.031	0.016	0.025
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.052)
EU membership	−0.003	−0.005	−0.007	0.000
	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.052)

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Table F.4: Reservist Attitudes and Bias Against Women's Leadership (Full Model) (Continued)

Mixed regime	−0.017	−0.004	−0.007	−0.014
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Left executive	−0.005	0.001	−0.003	−0.006
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	−0.024***	−0.026***	−0.024***	−0.024***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gender	0.116***	0.113***	0.117***	0.114***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income	0.020***	0.018***	0.019***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Religiosity	0.015***	0.015***	0.015***	0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Ideology	−0.034***	−0.034***	−0.034***	−0.034***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Do not belong to denomination	−0.006	−0.008	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Catholic	−0.015**	−0.015**	−0.014**	−0.014**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Protestant	0.009	0.007	0.001	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Orthodox	0.016	0.023	0.016	0.017
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Jew	−0.092***	−0.084***	−0.089***	−0.091***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Muslim	−0.057***	−0.062***	−0.065***	−0.064***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Hindu	−0.046***	−0.048***	−0.045***	−0.044***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)

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Table F.4: Reservist Attitudes and Bias Against Women's Leadership (Full Model) (Continued)

Buddhist	−0.042***	−0.039***	−0.039***	−0.043***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Other Christian	−0.013	−0.010	−0.012	−0.011
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Num.Obs.	123 073	110 975	121 053	123 343

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table reports coefficients from hierarchical linear models with random intercepts for country and year. Each column corresponds to a separate model using support for women's leadership as the dependent variable, and each row reports the estimated coefficients for the key independent variables. Degrees of freedom for fixed-effect tests are approximated using Satterthwaite's method.

G Additional Results

Militarized institutions that develop in response to rivalry may reduce the likelihood that governments adopt policies that directly shape women's political presence, such as gender quotas. In this section, I examine the relationship between rivalry and the adoption of gender quotas. I use the dataset from Hughes et al. (2019), which provides a binary country-year measure indicating whether a gender quota is in place. I supplement this dataset with additional information that I collected for the years 2016 through 2020.

Table G.1 reports two-way fixed-effects estimates of the association between lagged rivalry status and whether a country has a gender quota in place. In the full sample of countries that experienced a change in rivalry status, rivalry years are associated with a 14.9 percentage point lower predicted probability of having a quota relative to non-rivalry years ($p = 0.083$). The association becomes larger and more precisely estimated after excluding short-lived rivalry episodes. Among states with rivalry episodes lasting at least five years, rivalry is associated with a 20.7 percentage point lower predicted probability of having a quota ($p = 0.007$); among those with episodes lasting at least ten years, the estimated reduction is 20.1 percentage points ($p = 0.009$). These results suggest that sustained interstate hostility is associated with lower quota prevalence.

Table G.1: Rivalry and the Gender Quota Adoption

	All rivalry episodes	Rivalries lasting 5+ years	Rivalries lasting 10+ years
Rivalry	−0.149+	−0.207**	−0.201**
	(0.082)	(0.069)	(0.066)
Num.Obs.	748	705	485
R2	0.708	0.734	0.737
Controls	✓	✓	✓

Signif. Codes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$
Note: The table presents coefficients from two-way fixed effects panel models. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.

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